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A global history of Manila in the beginning 
of the Modern Era
Tackling an overdue subject in history 
Major scholars of global history consider the establishment of Manila as the capi-
tal of the Spanish Philippines, in 1571, as the kick-off for global trade. Dennis O. 
Flynn and Arturo Giráldez write in their often quoted article about international 
silver flows’ impact on world affairs that “Manila was the crucial entrepôt linking 
substantial, direct, and continuous trade between America and Asia for the first 
time in history.”1
In the light of Manila’s undeniable importance for the emergence of a continu-
ous Pacific Rim trade, the project of writing a history of the early modern2 Philip-
pines is not as bizarre as it may seem at first glance. This article is considered as 
an introduction into a far larger study of the Philippine’s early global integration. 
The basic idea here is to give a concrete example of how to apply global historical 
research. Late sixteenth century Manila offers the perfect setting for such a study 
since its mere existence depended on its attraction for several pre-modern eco-
nomic players. In my research I will focus on the three most influential powers 
in that context: Castile, China and Japan. As a matter of fact, Manila was of both 
economical and political significance for these three pre-modern states. What drove 
their actions apart from economic forces of supply and demand? How did its trad-
ing system work, how did each side react to each other and what crucial knowledge 
do we gain from it?
Looking at things from a broader angle is crucial for the understanding of 
complex matters and far-reaching processes. By using a global historical focus we 
might gain deeper understanding of processes leading to major changes in world 
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politics and economics, which have been overlooked by twentieth-century-writing 
of national history. In the best of all possible worlds, we might even be able to link 
our results to contemporary challenges on a global scale.
The early modern period is of particular interest in that regard since it was the 
time when a single connected world emerged. Manila, the capital of the only long-
lasting Spanish colony in Asia, grew as a result of the mergence of this world-wide 
interconnectedness. The fact that silver arrived in the young urban trading port 
under Spanish dominion to then quench Ming China’s enormous thirst for this pre-
cious metal was of major global significance. Silver made the world go round and 
Manila thrive. All activities of people calling at Manila for trade were connected to 
bullion.3 Recent research has shown that Chinese silk, the major commodity that 
was exchanged for American silver, was the second important item in the long-dis-
tance trade linking Asia, the Americas and Europe. 
When the Spanish conquistadores arrived there in 1570, after being unsuccess-
ful in establishing permanent rule over the Southern island of Cebu after 1565, a 
Muslim clan was ruling over the area. Because of the city’s perfect location, the 
Spaniards decided to build their capital there. The Muslim leader Rajah Sulaiman 
III agreed on a friendship treaty, but did not want to submit to Spanish sovereignty. 
As a result of a subsequent revolt, the Spanish captured and burnt the city. The fol-
lowing year Miguel López de Legazpi occupied the territory and founded a Span-
ish settlement at this small trading port. Within only a few years it turned into a 
prosperous port city, calling the attention of early modern global players like China, 
Japan and the Netherlands. In that regard, the case of early modern Manila may be 
studied according to the world-system theory with its focus on the role of centers 
and peripheries, with the Philippines being a classical periphery exploited by the 
metropolis.4 The history of South East Asia has hardly been studied from this angle. 
Only recently a few scholars started to set this record straight.5 According to Waller-
stein, the sixteenth century saw the emerging of the modern world-system. In the 
processes of global interaction that took place, Manila became the stage for trade 
and intercultural exchange between Asia, the Americas and Europe and we may ask 
what role it played exactly in this process of global transformation.
Another interesting question is, how remote Spain – that has also often been 
considered as an economically backward state – managed to dominate such an 
attractive location despite the pressure of fierce competition with other potent pre-
modern states? Here a thorough comparative research might provide the missing 
link in these entangled histories of pre-modern states and their long-lasting and 
far-reaching influence on seventeenth century’s world affairs. Events in allegedly 
peripheral sixteenth-century Manila had an impact on developments in different 
corners of the world while Manila itself offered a stage for various civilizations and 
186 ÖZG 20.2009.2
pre-modern states’ foreign affairs. Because of this compactness, I regard Manila as 
an ideally suited focal point for studying global transformations and global interde-
pendencies in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century.
In my research, I focus on Manila’s position within the foreign policies of the 
Castilian Monarchy, China and Japan. Important indicators will be the aspirations 
of these pre-modern states6, their political economies and institutions, as well as 
their notions of being culturally superior compared to each other. Besides one has 
to consider their political and economical embedment on a broader scale. In order 
to receive satisfying results, these matters have to be dealt with comparatively and 
approaches form various disciplines will have to be applied.7 Here, we are bound to 
consider the idea of a “clash of cultures”.8 My hypothesis is that striking differences 
in political economies and culture mattered.9 
For this article, I chose two case studies in order to analyse whether the sup-
posed clash of cultures did indeed take place in East and South East Asia after the 
Europeans had entered this part of the world. Firstly, I will look at the aspirations 
of the Tokugawa10 government to establish permanent trade with New Spain and 
to catch up in international trade. Then I will switch to the rebellion of the Chinese 
settlers of 1603 that became known as “the Spanish massacre of the Chinese”. Both 
cases provide evidence for my thesis of prevailing striking cultural differences, and 
both cases offer good opportunities to study culture’s impact on global political and 
economic developments. Before discussing these cases, I provide a brief overlook on 
early modern Manila’s urban development.
Early modern Manila
This study of early modern Manila covers the period between 1570, when it was 
occupied by the Spaniards, and the early 1640s, when Spanish relations with China 
and Japan deteriorated dramatically due to major political changes in East Asia as 
well as a decline in American silver imports to the Philippines. It now is as if these 
three pre-modern states were bound to go in a certain direction when they met in 
sixteenth century Manila. Their contributions to Manila turning into an unparal-
leled urban phenomenon and the Philippine’s early modern global integration are 
numerous. But it is not only the fascinating story of early modern multicultural 
encounters that makes this period worth studying. Manila became the new home 
for people from these three pre-modern states. However, it stands to reason that the 
indigenous people of the archipelago, who were called indios or Filipinos, regardless 
of their heterogeneous origins, were by far the largest ethnic group that settled in 
and around Manila and also had its share in these developments. Strong interde-
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pendence characterised Manila’s population. The Spanish depended on Chinese 
and Japanese supply, labour and taxes as well as China’s demand for silver – both 
American and Japanese – which is said to have been the reason for the Spaniards to 
be in the first place in South East Asia.11
In certain times the ruling Spaniards could not have maintained their sover-
eignty without Chinese or Japanese help, either monetary or military. In return, 
they offered a safe harbour and governmental protection, freedom of trade for 
incoming traders, and general conditions for a broad variety of specialised labour 
as well as their share in long-distance trade in silver and silk. However, peaceful co-
existence was challenged by various factors and incidents, as we will see later. 
Tools and Sources
As I have already mentioned, this study in global history is based on a comparative 
research aiming to answer big questions by tracing far-reaching processes and large 
structures.12 The ’big question’ here will be whether or to what extend a “clash of 
cultures” jeopardised early modern Manila and its intercultural relations. Therefore, 
I chose to look at the major economic players living in and coming to the Philippines 
in its early decades as Spanish colony. New results shall be drawn from Spanish and 
Japanese primary sources. Here, it is of major importance to read them both with 
and against the grain. In dealing with sixteenth and seventeenth century-records we 
constantly have to ask why certain information is given and what may have been the 
reasons for the lack of other information. An interdisciplinary linguistic approach 
can provide us with crucial information about cultural differences. In many cases, 
even allegedly ordinary things produced misunderstanding, distrust and resent-
ment consequently leading to major political measures. New insights gained from 
such a critical empirical study of early modern events shall be compared to the 
results of recent studies in these fields, as well as relevant theories of global history. 
The variety of sources shall help to resist the temptation of seeing things too one-
dimensional. It will, moreover, be of utter importance not to neglect the possibility 
of arbitrary behavior and selfish acting of protagonists on any side.
It has often been said that a study in history is as good as the choice of its 
sources. The sources I have selected for this research include data from the Archivo 
General de Indias – all sort of correspondence regarding the Spanish early governing 
of the Philippines – and two seventeenth century instruments of Japanese foreign 
affairs, namely the ikoku nikki (Diary of Foreign Countries) and the tsûkô ichiran 
(Records on Navigation).
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I am analysing large structures here on a broader level, including various states 
and cultures as well as complex historical contexts over time and space. Here, com-
parative methods will be applied in order to analyse and understand the processes 
of early modern change. In-depth knowledge of every case’s historical context is 
crucial in order to gain satisfying results.13
Case Study 1: 
Manila and Japan – 40 years of seesawing across the Chinese Sea
“The Japanese are those who are more feared in the islands than all 
the neighbouring nations, for they are very courageous and arrogant.”14 
After Japan had entered international politics in the course of the second half of 
the sixteenth century, one of the reasons for investing in good relations with the 
Spanish was the country’s new rulers interest in improving offshore navigation 
and mining technology. Speaking of political economy, sixteenth century Japan, 
which gradually developed an orientation towards the sea and the world outside 
the Sino-centric culture, lay somewhere between Spain and China. Although based 
on Confucian ideology, government was more open to commerce and could rely 
on several institutions controlling trade and foreign policies. However, this changed 
rapidly in the 1610s, when the ruling elite, the Tokugawa bakufu, introduced strong 
Neo-Confucian ethics and the government of the centralised country gradually 
became oriented inwardly. Portuguese and Spanish missionaries’ ardent zeal to 
spread Catholicism all over Japan led to a certain degree of domestic instability and 
has to be regarded as one of the reasons for such a drastic change in Japanese foreign 
policies. But before saying more about that, let us turn to how it all began.
In the wake of the ongoing civil war the islands lacked central power throughout 
the sixteenth century so that Ming China cut off its tributary trade relations with 
Japan, and even after 1567, when the Ming ban on foreign trade was eased, all sort 
of commerce with Japan continued to be prohibited.15 As a consequence, Japanese 
traders had to find new ways to take part in maritime trade: pirate trade and smug-
gling carried out by so-called wakô16 re-emerged. Local warlords supported this 
kind of external commerce carried out by groups of Chinese and Japanese private 
merchants and pirates, and Japan consequently faced a political and economic 
transformation.17 In the context of early Spanish-Japanese encounters it is crucial 
that the wakô network stretched over the entire South Chinese Sea and that the first 
Japanese merchants reaching the Philippine archipelago undoubtedly were part and 
parcel of it.18
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For the sake of unifying the country, both Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1582–1598) and 
Tokugawa Ieyasu (1600/03–1616) were eager to gain control over external trade. 
This is why they took measures to ban wakô raids and finally sought to organise 
maritime power and commerce in the South Chinese Sea by a new positioning of 
Japan within Asia.19 Toyotomi Hideyoshi was the first to impose a law, banning illicit 
trade in the South Chinese Sea in 1588.20 In 1602 Tokugawa Ieyasu – Japan’s soon to 
be shôgun and new hegemon – continuously expressed his aspirations of establishing 
regular trade between Japan and Mexico by offering the Spanish galleon – passing 
annually between Acapulco and Manila – access to a port in the Kanto area where 
its crew could seek refuge.21 Another measure taken in order to control and secure 
foreign trade was the introduction of passes embossed with the ruler’s vermillion 
seal – shuinjô.22 Only merchant ships equipped with a seal from the bakufu should 
be allowed to sell their goods in South East Asian ports. Interestingly enough, Luzón 
was among the most popular vermillion seal trading ships’ destinations during the 
first two decades of the Tokugawa reign.23 Here, it is particularly remarkable to see 
that around 1600 China and Japan, although coming from a similar ideological and 
cultural background, took completely different measures of foreign policy.
In the 1580s, merchant ships from Nagasaki and Hirado started their voyages to 
Manila and regular economic ties came into existence. They carried flour,24 salted 
fish, weapons, silk and handicrafts and in the first years they exchanged their goods 
to gold, honey and mirrors. Japanese products such as swords and armour, follow-
ing picture screens, lacquer ware, rice, barley, wheat, flour, salted fish, pork and 
horses are mentioned by the Spanish writers in their lists of Japanese imports to 
the Philippines. Silver and copper bars were also included in some of the cargoes. 
Japanese wheat (udon) is often mentioned in the Japanese sources to be the main 
trading item on the Japanese side. Exports from the Philippines to Japan consisted 
mainly of Chinese raw and manufactured silks, gold, and the old Chinese ceramics 
sought after by connoisseurs of chanoyu25, in addition to European items, as well as 
incense and aromatic woods.26 
A group of seafarers is said to have settled in Northern Luzón in the early 
sixteenth century, founding the town of Aparri at the river Cagayan where their 
pirate-captain Taifusa built a fortress for 600 people in which they both lived and 
stored their captured goods, primarily gold and arms.27 In 1582, Spanish soldiers 
where sent to that Japanese settlement in Aparri and the Japanese are said to have 
surrendered and left their colony to the Spaniards after a fierce battle.28 
Before the Japanese were settled in their own residential district, they lived 
among the Spaniards within the fortified city, called intramuros. But this commu-
nity of sojourners from Japan became too large and difficult to control in the eyes 
of the Spaniards. Ranking colonial officials considered the Japanese a proud and 
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sometimes arrogant people who proved more resistant to Spanish authority than 
other Asians and whose dealings with the Filipinos and Chinese too often ended 
in conflict. As a result they were placed in a special area where they could be more 
easily observed. In 1585 they were assigned to Dilao – the Tagalog word for yel-
low – and placed under the supervision of the Franciscans.29 
For almost fifty years this Japantown, or nihonmachi30, preserved a Japanese 
cultural atmosphere. Its residents continued to use their mother tongue, to wear tra-
ditional dress like kimono and maintained their native cooking and specific forms 
of entertainment.31 This shows that most Japanese at Manila were not willing to be 
integrated in the society of their new home country, a fact that explains why they 
permanently faced suspicion of the ruling class and other residents. 
Even though the number of Japanese residents was far smaller than that of the 
Chinese, they are said to have caused significant troubles to the Spanish authorities, 
especially in the period between 1605 and 1609, when a series of riots occurred. 
They were disposed to be more turbulent and resentful of any attempt to control; 
and they generally conducted themselves as though conscious of the support of 
a government that was very tenacious on points of national honour, which made 
them more independent compared to Fujianese settlers who could not count on the 
patronage of Chinese authorities.32 
William D. Wray divides Japanese emigrants in three categories: The vermillion-
seal ship businessmen, Christian refugees and mercenaries or political exiles from 
the unification process as well as veterans from Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea; the 
last group consists mainly of opponents of the Tokugawa clan who left the country 
due to increasing political and social pressure.33 
Like some of their Chinese counterparts, many Japanese residents, too, managed 
to accumulate a certain amount of wealth and social status by running their own 
shops, trading the cargo of the Japanese ships or finding employment as captains, 
sailors, soldiers, personal assistants or mercenaries for the Spanish.34 As a result of 
these activities, some Japanese settlers played an important role in the urban society. 
However, it would be wrong to ignore the fact that several hundred Japanese were 
brought to Manila as slaves during this period.35
An ambivalent attitude – a mixture of appreciation and fear – towards Japanese 
traders and residents increased after 1592, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi at the height 
of his power and imperial boastfulness menaced the Spaniards with his potential 
to conquer the Philippines.36 In 1592 and in 1593, he sent his ambassador Harada 
Kiyemon with letters to the Spanish governor in Manila, informing him about his 
enormous might and his intention to conquer the Philippines, unless the Spanish 
paid tribute to Japan.37
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The Spanish answers to this threat remained vague but they felt more and 
more uneasy about the growing number of Japanese in the city and some officials 
suggested that they should all be sent back to Japan, “for they are of no benefit or 
utility, but, on the contrary, very harmful.”38 The Japanese continued, however, to 
make annual journeys in which they preyed on the Chinese junks bound for Manila. 
Regardless of ongoing chilly relations, the Franciscan friar Pedro Baptista – on 
behalf of Governor Dasmariñas – and Hideyoshi signed a kind of friendship treaty 
in 1593. However, this act of friendship had little effect. When in 1596 the Manila 
galleon San Felipe capsized on the coast of Shikoku due to a broken keel, pent-up 
tensions on both sides gave rise to one of the most dramatic episodes in the history 
of early modern Japanese-Spanish relations. These events can be seen as an escala-
tion of mutual distrust and serious communication problems.39 After Hideyoshi 
had confiscated the whole cargo the distressed captain of the galleon threatened 
the Japanese with a Spanish conquest.40 Fierce competition in proselytising among 
Portuguese Jesuits and Spanish Franciscans present another crucial aspect in the 
aggressions that followed. In February 1597, one Mexican, one Portuguese, six 
Spanish friars as well as twenty Japanese Christians were crucified in Nagasaki 
where they are commemorated until today as the first Japanese martyrs. The inci-
dent had a significant effect on the situation in Manila where fear of a Japanese 
intrusion revived. Governor Tello who was frightened of a Japanese invasion of the 
Philippines sent a present to Toyotomi Hideyoshi, immediately after having been 
informed about the incident. After Hideyoshi’s death in 1598 and the transforma-
tion of power to the Tokugawa clan, relations with Japan improved considerably. 
One of the first things Tokugawa Ieyasu did in order to propitiate the Spanish at 
Manila, was issuing a new ban on piracy. In 1601, he sent Jerónimo de Jesús – who 
was already sent on a political mission to Japan in 1594 by the Spanish – as an envoy 
to the Spanish governor, ensuring the latter about his intentions to establish regular 
trade relations with the Philippines and New Spain. In February of the following 
year, Ieyasu ordered another Spanish friar and some Japanese to the new governor, 
Pedro Acuña, eager to accomplish his commercial aspirations. In a letter Ieyasu 
introduced the shuinjô-system including all its conditions, as well as his wish of 
establishing relations with New Spain.41 Acuña, however, avoided pledging anything 
regarding that delicate matter.42 
However, pirates continued attacking Spanish ports in the Philippines. In 1604, 
Pedro de Acuña informed the Spanish king that Japanese pirates were again oper-
ating around the Luzón coasts.43 In 1609, a Japanese ship was overcome and its 
crew killed by the Spaniards. At last governor Tello protested to Ieyasu against the 
piratical practices of his people and the shôgun, to show his good faith, ordered the 
seizure of six ships that had cleared from southern ports of Japan to plunder in Phil-
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ippine waters and had more than 200 of their crew members crucified as a warning. 
Besides he encouraged the Spanish in a letter to execute any Japanese trouble-
maker.44 In this period of rising tensions, the retired governor Vivero and Ieyasu met 
unexpectedly in 1609. Again, a Manila galleon happened to be shipwrecked in the 
waters around Japan and the two former opponents started to negotiate a friend-
ship treaty between Spain and Japan. Ieyasu agreed to grant fair treatment of the 
Spanish friars, but evaded an anti-Dutch article suggested by Vivero. He was willing 
to tolerate the presence of the friars on condition that regular trade would finally 
be established between New Spain and Japan. For the sake of economic advance-
ment of his nation, he further requested the services of 50 Spanish miners from 
Mexico who should introduce Western methods of silver exploitation. To further his 
merchant maritime program, Ieyasu asked for shipwrights who could instruct the 
Japanese in the construction of ocean-going vessels.45 At that time Japan still lacked 
its own offshore-vessels. For the most of its far overseas adventures it depended on 
junks and navigation skills of Fujian entrepreneurs.
But things did not go according to plan. Various reasons and events can be called 
to account therefore. One of them was the reluctant behaviour of the Spanish con-
cerning the Japanese wish to enhance overseas trade. Complying Ieyasu’s request 
was considered contra-productive in the eyes of the Spanish who still feared a Japa-
nese attack, especially after they had become aware of the friendly relations between 
the Tokugawa clan and Dutch merchants. The mere presence of the Dutch in Asia 
was a thorn in the Spaniards’ flesh but things even aggravated when they started to 
boycott all Spanish action in the South China Sea in the early seventeenth century. 
The Dutch were determined to drive their archenemies out of Asia and spared no 
pains to attain that goal. On the Japanese side, the spread of Christianity remained 
a source of irritation and was considered to disturb domestic peace by the leading 
authorities. On this account, various measures were taken by the bakufu. During 
1612 and 1614 two anti-Christian edicts were issued and, as a further means of 
strengthening Japan’s position within Asia, all foreign policies were based on the 
so-called shinkoku-ideology, the idea of Japan as the land the of gods.46
In 1620, king Philip III (1598–1621) ordered the governor and the audiencia to 
adopt whatever measures seemed best to them, though they were warned to take 
care not to jeopardise the relations of trade and friendship then existing.47 Before 
this letter could have been received in Manila, Governor Fajardo wrote to the king 
that many Japanese had been expelled. However, a royal decree of the following year 
complained that the Japanese were allowed to stay because of the “negligence and 
carelessness” of the authorities at Manila.48 
In 1623, Governor Alonso Fajardo sent a mission to the shôgun informing him 
about the enthronement of Philip IV. The envoys arrived at Satsuma and not until 
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March 1624 were told that they would not be received by shôgun Iemitsu. The same 
year the bakufu decreed breaking off all sort of relations with the Spaniards and 
expelled them from Japan. From that time on the ports of Japan were officially 
closed to vessels that had cleared from Manila. Four ships, which later appeared in 
Nagasaki harbour, were turned away. The lord of the city threatened one Spanish 
captain that any of his countrymen who dared to enter the port in the future would 
have both ship and crew burned. Finally an edict of 1638 forbade the Spaniards, on 
pain of death, to put foot on Japanese soil or to enter a Japanese port under any 
pretext.49
However, despite official restrictions Japanese merchants continued to call on 
Manila. In 1630, two ambassadors came to Manila, one of the governor of Naga-
saki, the other representing the feudal lord of Satsuma. It is not surprising that the 
Spanish were again puzzled by the ambiguity of these events. In that period the 
authorities in Manila experienced continuous pressure of the Council of the Indies 
that wanted the authorities in the Philippines to maintain good relations with the 
Japanese. This fact bewilders insofar as in earlier years the council tended to be very 
reluctant when it came to dealing with matters concerning Japan, which shows the 
complexity of reacting to problems in such a huge empire.
As I am seeing things, early modern relations between Japan and the Castilian 
Empire are a classical case of complicated embedment. Promising stages of well-bal-
anced diplomacy based on bilateral agreements were always of short-lived charac-
ter. When the Spanish first came to South East Asia and established reign over the 
Philippines they offered the Japanese a most welcome new port where they – like 
in Portuguese Macao – had both access to Chinese silk and European luxuries. But 
in the course of the early seventeenth century things changed rapidly. Thanks to 
the arrival of the English and the Dutch, who soon established trade factories on 
Japanese soil, the Japanese were no longer dependent on Iberian traders and there-
fore it became easier for them to get rid of the hated Catholic missionaries. Many 
records show that Spanish missionary zeal triggered off a certain ill-feeling among 
the Japanese. On the other hand, Spanish measures to ease tensions and maintain 
commercial links between Manila and Japan were often belated since foreign policy 
still remained in the hands of the king and his councils in distant Spain. 
I even dare to claim that this seesaw would have continued for several decades 
had not Japan reduced its maritime affairs to a trickle. The reason why Japan finally 
backed out despite its ambitious goal to participate in global economic affairs in 
the days of Tokugawa Ieyasu, who dedicated a good deal of his political efforts to 
establish international relations, is simple. After about hundred years of civil war the 
rulers regarded internal stability as a matter of top priority. When they realised that 
they would not be able to accomplish it as long as Christian beliefs interfered with 
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their Neo-Confucian concepts, they broke off relations with the Catholic powers. 
Alongside with a change in ideology aiming at a new positioning in Asia and eco-
nomic strengthening thanks to huge silver deposits and technological advancement, 
it gained liberation from the Chinese tributary system. The encounters with the 
Europeans in the late sixteenth century definitely had a hand in this transformation 
process. 
Case study 2: The Chinese rebellion of 1603
Recent research on the European’s arrival in South East Asia in the early modern 
period has shown that all Western powers owed their presence as well as their 
commercial success to a long existing and vivid overseas trading network of 
Chinese, Muslim and other local traders. Within this system Manila soon turned 
into a link between these Sino-Indian-Muslim networks50 and new ones, namely 
those sustaining Mexican and European trade. But the Spanish benefited not only 
from their involvement in trade and their role as middlemen. The young colony’s 
capital drew its direct income from introducing residence permits51 and a tax for 
visiting merchants called almojarifazgo. Its supply depended highly on Chinese set-
tlers. Until 1581 all trade was carried out tax-free. In the year 1581 governor Don 
Gonzalo Ronquillo ordered to levy a three percent tax on all goods coming from 
China for the sake of improving the financial situation of the impoverished colony. 
The scales of interdependence between Europeans and Chinese soon tipped under 
the weight of increasing influence wielded by the Chinese.52 Frictions between the 
European headquarters and the Chinese settlers, sangleyes53, on account of this led 
to tension and distrust which at times erupted into violent uprisings. Consequently, 
the incumbent governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa assigned the Chinese their 
own quarter, the Parian in the early 1580s.54 First it was located within the city, but 
when fires devastated Manila in 1583, the Chinese quarter was rebuilt outside the 
city walls. Nevertheless, many Chinese merchants and artisans still had their shops 
within the city.55 
Soon after the Spanish had established their reign over the archipelago, the 
colony’s first governor Miguel de Legazpi informed King Philip II about Chinese 
junks calling on ports in Luzón bringing “silks, woollens, bells, porcelains, perfu-
mes, iron, tin, coloured cloths, and other small wares, and in return they take away 
gold and wax.”56 
As we have noted before, Chinese traders used to participate actively in inter-
Asian trade for a long time illicitly, since the Ming court by any means wanted to 
abide by its tributary trade system and expressively forbade overseas trade. In 1567 
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and again in 1589, restrictions were smoothed for Haicheng traders, granting them 
88 licenses for foreign destination. Similar to the Tokugawa vermilion seal system, 
the highest number of such licenses was issued for Luzón.57 Hence, a number of 
Chinese junks called on Manila and every year many Chinese stayed. The reason 
why they remained in the Philippines was not only because they wanted a better life 
but also because of the monsoon conditions that only allowed travelling between 
May and July. So there was often not sufficient time for trading transactions, which 
is why many Chinese decided to stay over for one year – despite a strict prohibition 
from the Ming court.58 Like in Dutch Batavia, the real colonists of Spanish Manila 
were Fujianese people who settled in a far larger number than Spaniards and mana-
ged to exploit the economy with their sophisticated merchant skills.59 But it was not 
only their outstanding economic success that created envy among other residents 
and caused harm to the social balance in the city. According to Adshead, the reason 
that overseas Chinese communities were the product of private enterprise, much 
of it small-scale, non-established and often even criminal, meant that these China-
towns hosted many unwelcomed, plebeian emigrants.60
The sangleyes monopolised urban services by earning their money as bakers, 
barbers or shoemakers, in short they technically engaged in most crafts. Besides 
they were highly valued in the ship construction business, participated in the gal-
leon commerce, and even provided much food for Manila’s residents through their 
trading network with South China. Their dedication to fishing and gardening in the 
surroundings of Manila also helped nourishing the city.61 Their products were often 
considered more beautiful and cheaper than those of Spain. The Chinese responded 
soon to the needs of intramuros by producing clothes in the latest Spanish fashion 
and catering for the everyday needs of the Spanish population, while craftsmen back 
home in Fujian contributed to quench the Americas’ new elite’s thirst for luxury 
items.62 It is claimed that the Spaniards did not only buy the low-cost crafts of the 
Chinese, but also frequented their eating-houses, where they will probably have 
experienced lots of Chinese culture since the Chinese kept their language and their 
traditions in everyday life.
From a social-economic point of view it is also interesting to see that several 
bootless Chinese even crossed the Pacific by the Manila galleon to Mexico in order 
to set up their business there. We have record of Chinese passengers on a Manila 
galleon as early as in 1585.63 In 1635, the Spanish barbers complained of unfair 
competition.64
Some of the restrictive Spanish policies towards the Chinese can be seen as 
measures to maintain urban safety. So, for example, an initiative by General Gov-
ernor Francisco Tello de Guzmán who forbade Chinese to settle “intramuros” since 
their wooden houses were a fire hazard.65
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In various aspects we find striking differences in the attitude towards Chinese 
among churchmen and representatives of administration. One major example con-
cerns the matter of self-governance of the sangleyes. Since the number of Chinese 
settlers grew steadily, and probably since they realised their important position 
for the prospering of the city, they started to demand the right for self-govern-
ance at the turn of the seventeenth century. Both royal and church officials finally 
confirmed the need for a special protector as long as the office would be hold by a 
Spaniard.66 Here, Spanish officials were probably only driven by greed, not under-
standing for the East Asian neighbours,67 since such an office was a promising 
source of revenue.68
But let us turn to the main issue: What caused the uprising of 1603? In spring 
1603 three mandarins came to Manila onboard of a great ship without merchan-
dise, determined to explore the supposed gold mountains of Cavite, the port region 
of Manila. No wonder, such a strange mission raised the suspicion of the Spanish 
who had been on alert because of the constant rise in Chinese settlers for a long 
time. Even if this mission can be regarded as the source of the tensions that led to 
the uprising, it was certainly not the only reason. The problems lay far deeper. The 
Chinese in Manila had experienced severe repressions and unfair treatment for 
several years. General Governor Dasmariñas, for example, is said to have forced 
the governor of the Chinese to provide 250 men for his expedition to the Moluc-
cas in 1592.69 Besides, the coasts of Manila had experienced increased Japanese and 
Chinese piracy in previous years. Simultaneously with the mandarins’ presence in 
the Spanish colony’s capital a fire broke out in the hospital for the Chinese. For 
whatever reason the Spanish authorities did not take any measures to prevent fur-
ther losses. Therefore the governor was later on accused of purposely letting the fire 
continue in order to harm the Chinese.
In his latest book on early modern global connectedness, Timothy Brook gives 
another interesting anecdote worth mentioning in the context of lacking intercul-
tural sensibility: “The Spanish archbishop, who had recently arrived in Manila and 
had not yet gotten a feeling for the delicacy of the situation, made things worse that 
summer by delivering an ill-timed sermon accusing the Chinese of sodomy and 
witchcraft.”70 Tensions soon led into violence and in autumn 1603 the Chinese set-
tlers finally joined their forces against the authorities.
Much has been written on the uprising of the sangleyes and the severe punish-
ment by the Spaniards, and both contemporary and later descriptions of the event 
differ largely depending on the author and his standpoint.71 The Spanish are said 
to have burnt the Chinese silk market, the alcaicería,72and in the following dread-
ful events joint Spanish-Filipino and Japanese forces are said to have killed at least 
20.000 Chinese. Here, we should turn to our relevant clash-of-cultures-analysis. It 
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goes without saying that 1603 was a particularly hard year for the Chinese settlers 
at Manila.73 Both the Chinese and the Spanish, who were in permanent need of 
financial support from the mother country, may have had good reasons for exag-
gerating the numbers. No matter how big the loss on the Chinese side, one would 
expect the Chinese emperor to take revenge for the unrighteousness that happened 
to his people. Point is that it is not clear whether the Ming Court still considered 
the settlers of these overseas communities as Chinese. All it did was asking the 
audiencia to serve up for justice.74 Other sources state that the Fujianese magistrate 
was blamed for provoking the Spanish and disgracing Ming China. Again, one can 
speak of entirely different policies of China and Spain in this context. Chinese self-
conception differed completely from the Japanese and Spanish perspectives. Early 
seventeenth-century China was inwardly oriented, while foreign relations played a 
major rule in Japanese and Spanish daily politics during that time. Borao concludes 
that “since the events had taken place outside China, it was difficult for the imperial 
officers to verify them, which is why they put forward brief and detached explana-
tions”.75 Xu Xue-ju, an administrative commissioner of Fujian calls for revenge for 
this unjust Spanish manoeuvre, lamenting the fact that the Chinese had contributed 
mainly to Luzón’s development. Emperor Wan-Li finally turned his demand down, 
using the following arguments: 
“(1) Due to their long tradition in trade and commerce, the people of Luzón 
were practically their subjects. (2) The antagonism, as well as the confronta-
tion, took place outside of China. (3) Merchants are humble folk, and there-
fore, not worth waging battle for. (4) Their merchants, upon going to Luzón, 
abandoned their families without considering their filial ties. (5) An expedi-
tion to Luzón will only drain their armed forces.”76
Other official records show that Fujian officials, who were called Chinese viceroys 
by the Spanish, demanded restitution for the slaughter of 1603. In 1606, the Council 
of the Indies finally granted compensation for the victims of 1603.77 Meanwhile, 
Chinese merchants started reviving trade with Manila, resettling in the rebuilt 
Parian – 1,500 resident permits were issued in 160678 – and already in the same year 
one could find some of them in the service of Spaniards.79 We know that right after 
the revolt, the city and its inhabitants faced lean years since the entire network of 
supply that was based on the sangleyes had collapsed.80
As I have mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Manila flourished thanks to 
various activities of Chinese merchants and settlers. The city would not have turned 
into a pivot for global trade without their contributions. Difference in culture and 
ideology, however, often became a hindrance for smooth interaction. Hence, Manila’s 
full potential as a global port-city was never fully tapped and utilised.
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Final Comments
This article is part of a larger project aiming to understand East and Southeast Asia’s 
integration into one global society and its entanglement in early modern history on 
a global scale. It aims to give a well-balanced view on the structure of early modern 
encounters in the Pacific and to show non-European actors’ cultural and econo-
mic contribution to world affairs. Dealing with primary sources shall help to set 
the record straight and clear up common misunderstandings like the one that the 
Spanish were only determined to spread their imperialism and Catholicism as far 
as possible, regardless of the consequences. I will not argue the point that proselyti-
sing was of great importance to the Spanish colonisers and that at times missionary 
issues even had impact on political decisions. Looking at the small number of Spa-
nish settlers – not more than 1,300 settlers in 1603 – and their frequent petitions 
to the Spanish king to send both money and people one may ask how they should 
have been able to pursue an independent policy at all. However, so far scholars have 
overlooked that fact in their reflections on the Spanish Philippines. Next to anti-
Spanish historiography there has been a tendency to ignore the singularity of mat-
ters in South East Asia and to deal with the Philippines as an appendix of Spanish 
America. However, the situation in South East Asia was completely different and,as 
we have seen, the Spanish were not always sufficiently prepared to (re-)act properly. 
At the same time East Asia faced several changes. Japan became independent and 
almost autarkic, while the Chinese Empire, on the other hand, for the first time in 
its glorious history saw itself dependent on foreign, “barbarian” support. 
Governing and living in multicultural Manila often meant responding to alter-
ing situations in East Asia. Not only the Spaniards’ attitudes often fluctuated from 
one extreme to another. Thus, at times Japanese or Chinese traders were encour-
aged to settle in Manila, at times they were forced to leave. At times the East Asians 
cooperated with the Spanish and welcomed them in their countries, at times they 
tried to expel them for good. 
Finally, I would like to get back to Manila as a place where all these pre-modern 
states met. Spanish, Chinese and Japanese people travelled to Manila for different 
reasons. Although they all faced various difficulties in establishing themselves in the 
newly founded city on its path to global integration, they all came because of better 
economic outlooks and the chance to improve their lives. The city, its people and 
visitors were interacting permanently. Manila would not have advanced without 
contributions from abroad, while all three countries benefited from their connec-
tions to Manila and its position as intermediary trading port for Sino-Japanese 
trade. As such it played an important role in the early modern global integration 
processes of all three countries. For Spain it became a steppingstone to East Asia and 
199ÖZG 20.2009.2
an essential element in its long-distance trade in silver and silk. For China it was 
an essential provider of silver and offered many opportunities for entrepreneurial 
spirited immigrants from Fujian. For Japan it was one of the first and most impor-
tant places to prove itself on an international business stage and to become globally 
connected. 
A profound study in global history – which cannot be given in a limited paper 
like this – should help us to differentiate our views of early modern international 
relations and power distributions as well as the role of political economies within 
them. Culture and ideology matter as much here, as do institutions. 
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